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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(i) of 
the Utah Code. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs Motion to Set 
Aside Stipulation for Dismissal upon the basis of Rule 60(b)(l V3X6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure when said Motion was made on the basis of mistake and/or 
misrepresentation. (Standard of appellate review is correction of abuse of discretion, 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). 
B. Did the trial court fail to apply the law of mistake (mutual or unilateral) or the 
contract requirement of meeting of the minds when it denied plaintiffs Motion to Set 
Aside the Order Dismissing its Complaint with Prejudice. (Standard of appellate review 
is correction of error, Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Addendum at page 44). 
Statement of the case: 
a. This appeal is from a final order entered in the Fifth District Court, Washington 
County. 
b. Plaintiff filed Complaint against defendants, a contractor, and homeowner. 
c. The parties reached what they believed was an agreement and on belief that 
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they had performed as promised, stipulated to the dismissal of plaintiffs Complaint with 
prejudice. 
d. Said dismissal with prejudice was signed and entered by the Court on 
September 14. 1999. 
e. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order Dismissing its Complaint with 
Prejudice and reinstate its claim against defendants on or about November 9. 1999, after 
discovering that defendant. RanCo Homes had not performed as it had promised. 
f. A non-evidentiary hearing was held before the trial court on May 17, 2000. and 
the Court denied plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside per Order signed June 2, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
a. Plaintiff provided materials and performed labor in the construction of a home 
owned by defendant Summerhays, at the request of the contractor on the job, defendant. 
RanCo Homes, Inc.. (hereafter RanCo). (See plaintiffs Complaint at paragraph 11, page 
2 of the record, page 2 of Addendum). 
b. Plaintiff was not paid by either the contractor or the owner and filed a timely 
mechanic's Lien and timely mechanic's lien Complaint against the property and the 
defendants. (See plaintiffs Complaint at paragraphs 8 and 15. pages 2 and 3 of the 
record, pages 2 and 3 of Addendum). 
c. Plaintiff and defendants entered into an agreement to dismiss plaintiffs 
Complaint with prejudice in exchange for plaintiff receiving certain trust deeds and trust 
deed notes against properties owned by defendant RanCo. (See Stipulation for 
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Dismissal page 19 of the record, page 6 of Addendum). 
d. Plaintiff, plaintiffs attorney and RanCo's attorney all understood that the Trust 
Deed given against Painted Desert Estates. Phase I. Lot 4. was a first position Trust Deed. 
(See letters of May 11. 1999. July 26. 1999. and Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson at 
paragraph 7. respectively pages 43-44. 45-46. and 30-31 of the record). (Addendum 
pages 28-29. 30-31 and 15. 16). 
e. Subsequent to the dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, plaintiff 
learned, through a Notice of Foreclosure, that the aforesaid property had a Trust Deed 
with priority in time over plaintiffs Trust Deed. (See Affidavit of Howard Chuntz. 
paragraph 4. at page 26 of the record, page 11 of Addendum). 
f. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside the dismissal with prejudice and reinstate 
plaintifTs Complaint against defendants in this matter on or about November 9. 1999. on 
the basis that plaintiff entering into said Stipulation for Dismissal was obtained 
fraudulently or by mutual mistake of the parties. 
g. RanCo filed a Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiffs Motion. (See record at 
pages 34-46. pages 19-31 of Addendum). 
h. Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum and supporting affidavits. (See record at 
pages 47-54. pages 32-40 of Addendum). 
i. The Court heard oral argument on plaintiffs Motion on May 17. 2000. and 
denied the same per Order dated June 2, 2000. (See Order Denying Motion to Set Aside 
at pages 98-99 of the record, pages 41-42 of Addendum). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
a. Failure to set aside order pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the basis upon which 
the trial court may relieve a party from a final order in the furtherance of justice. Plaintiff 
presented reasons under two of the six allowable subheadings, (1) mistake and (3) fraud, 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party. Upon the facts and 
circumstances presented in plaintiff's Motion, the Court was required, in the furtherance 
of justice, to set aside the Order of Dismissal. 
b. Failure to apply contract law to the stipulation. 
The Stipulation to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint was an agreement to which basic 
contract principles should have been applied. In order for a contract to be binding, there 
must be a meeting of the minds with respect to the terms of a settlement agreement or the 
settlement agreement is not enforceable. In addition, if the parties are mutually mistaken 
as to the terms of the contract or if one party is mistaken, but the other knew of the 
mistake and remains silent, or acted with fraudulently affirmative behavior, then the 
contract must be reformed or rescinded or held to be unenforceable. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court's ruling denying plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside contains no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. Therefore, plaintiff's arguments on appeal are 
based upon what it surmises were the trial court's unwritten findings and conclusions. 
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A. FAILURE TO SET ASIDE ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b): 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "on motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party . . . from 
a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;... (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party;. . ." Said Rule further indicates that a motion for the 
above referred to reasons must be made not more than three (3) months after the order 
was entered. In the present case, plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside was made within two (2) 
months of entry of the Order and set forth facts establishing that plaintiff had made a 
mistake and/or defendant had misrepresented the terms of the agreement to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien complaint against RanCo as contractor and 
Summerhays as owner for unpaid labor and materials provided to Summerhays' home at 
RanCo's request. Thereafter, the attorneys for RanCo and plaintiff entered into 
settlement negotiations wherein RanCo proposed giving plaintiff trust deed notes secured 
by trust deeds on real property. RanCo's attorney's letter to plaintiffs attorney dated 
May 11, 1999, (Addendum pages 28-29), referred to two separate first position trust 
deeds and trust deed notes. The second letter from RanCo's counsel to plaintiffs 
counsel, dated July 26, 1999, (Addendum pages 30-31), clarifies changes in the 
agreement with respect to a settlement of a matter not dealing with the lawsuit involving 
Summerhays and reiterating the agreement already reached between the parties with 
respect to the debt owing by RanCo to plaintiff with respect to the Summerhays 
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Complaint. Nothing in the July 26th letter makes any reference to an alteration in the 
agreement that RanCo would give plaintiff a first position trust deed note and trust deed 
with respect to the Summerhays debt and plaintiff had no reason to expect that any 
change was intended. 
Despite the expectation on plaintiffs part that it would receive a first trust deed 
securing the debt owing on the Summerhays Complaint, RanCo delivered a note and trust 
deed that was not a first position trust deed. Plaintiff did not discover this situation until 
after the Order Dismissing its Complaint with Prejudice was signed and entered by the 
Court. Plaintiff learned of this mistake when it received a Notice of Trustee's Sale from 
the party holding the first position trust deed against the property securing plaintiffs note 
and trust deed. 
Richard A. Nelson, president of RanCo, states in his Affidavit at paragraph 7 
(Addendum pages 15-16), that "through an oversight and miscommunication, Mr. 
Mitchell (RanCo's attorney) inadvertently stated in a letter that not only the Tamarack 
matter would involve a first position deed of trust, but he also erroneously stated that the 
Summerhays matter would be handled by a deed of trust in first position." At paragraph 
16 of Mr. Nelson's Affidavit, (Addendum page 17) he asserts that "I cannot identify why 
there was a communication break down on whether the deed of trust on Lot 4 would be a 
first or second position deed of trust as between me and my attorney." 
It is clear from these letters and the affidavit that a mistake in understanding of the 
terms of the agreement between the parties upon which the Stipulation to Dismiss had 
6 
occurred. On that basis alone, the Court should have granted plaintiffs Motion to set 
aside the Order Dismissing its Complaint and not doing so was an abuse of discretion. 
If RanCo's president and its attorney knew, at the time of submitting the 
Stipulation to plaintiff for signature, that it was giving a second position trust deed when 
a first position trust deed had been promised, then that would certainly constitute a 
misrepresentation, if not fraud, upon plaintiff, and the Court again should have granted 
plaintiffs Motion, and not doing so was an abuse of discretion. 
B. FAILURE TO APPLY CONTRACT PRINCIPLES TO THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND RESCIND OR CONCLUDE THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS 
NOT ENFORCEABLE: 
"An agreement of compromise and settlement constitutes an executory accord. 
Since an executory accord constitutes a valid enforceable contract basic contract 
principles affect the determination of when a settlement agreement should be enforced." 
John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment Inc.. 876 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1994). Citing 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys.. Inc.. 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1993). 
"Contractual mutual assent requires assent by all parties to the same thing in the same 
sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms." ihid, John Deere Co. 
In the present case, plaintiff agreed to a first position trust deed and was delivered 
a second position trust deed. If the parties were not mutually mistaken about the status of 
the trust deed to be delivered, then there was no meeting of the minds on this term of their 
agreement and, therefore, no enforceable settlement agreement. 
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The agreement upon which the parties' Stipulation to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint was also unenforceable by reason of the theory of mistake. "It is the rule in 
this forum that the power to reform a written instrument by reason of mutual mistake 
exists under three (3) alternative proofs: (1) That the instrument as made failed to 
conform to what both parties intended; or (2) that the claiming party was mistaken as to 
its actual content and the other party, knowing of this mistake, kept silent; or (3) that the 
claiming party was mistaken as to actual content because of fraudulent affirmative 
behavior." Guardian State Bank v. Stangl 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989), citing Mabey v. Kay 
Peterson Constr. Co.. 682 P.2d 287, 290 (Utah 1984). Again, either plaintiff, its attorney 
and RanCo's attorney all understood that RanCo was giving plaintiff a first position trust 
deed for the Summerhays debt and, therefore, all were mutually mistaken about the 
second position trust deed that was actually given, or plaintiff mistakenly believed it was 
receiving a first position trust deed for the Summerhays debt from RanCo, but RanCo 
knew of this mistake and kept silent about only giving plaintiff a second position trust 
deed. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that there was a failure of the parties to reach an 
understanding with respect to whether plaintiff was receiving a first or second position 
trust deed, either by mistake or non-agreement. Regardless of how this error came about, 
the settlement agreement should have been found to be unenforceable or should have 
been rescinded by the trial court because the elements of an enforceable contract did not 
exist. The trial court erred in the application of contract law with respect to the 
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underlying agreement upon which the Stipulation to Dismiss PlaintiflPs Complaint was 
based. 
The trial court should have concluded that the agreement between the parties to 
dismiss plaintiffs Complaint was not enforceable and should have set aside the Order 
Dismissing PlaintiflPs Complaint and reinstated plaintiffs claims against defendants to be 
heard on their merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court failed to properly apply contract law to the parties' 
Stipulation and because it abused its discretion by not applying Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, this Court should remand the case to the trial court and require it to set 
aside its Order of Dismissal and reinstate plaintiffs Complaint. 
DATED December 8, 2000.
 r 
Howard Chuntz if 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 'j 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this fijtri day of December, 2000, to the following: 
RanCo Homes, Inc. 
P.O. Box 910472 
St. George. UT 84790 
Bruce D. Jenkins 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee, Summerhays 
352 East Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, UT 84790 
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ADDENDUM 
11 
& _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, 
CM. No. J f i M ^ i ! 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RAN CO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, 
Defendants. 
/ 
COMES NOW Whitewater Whirlpool Baths & Systems, Inc., by and through its attorney, 
Howard Chuntz, and complains against the above named defendants as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation, qualified and authorized to do business in 
this State and was so qualified at all times mentioned herein. 
2. The real property which is the subject of this action is located in 
Washington County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendants, Barbara R. Summerhays (hereafter Summerhays) is a resident 
of Washington County, State of Utah, and defendant, Ran Co Homes (hereafter Ran Co) is a 
Utah corporation doing business in Washington County, State of Utah. 
4. The identities of defendants, Does 1 through 25 are as yet unknown to 
plaintiff and plaintiff will amend its Complaint to specify said defendants at such time as said 
identities become known. 
5. Summerhays is the owner of the real property that is the subject of this 
litigation. 
6. Ran Co contracted with plaintiff for plaintiff to provide building materials 
and labor and agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $8,203.34 on or about the 5th day of October, 
1998. 
7. Said materials and labor were delivered and performed by plaintiff and 
were accepted by defendants. 
8. There remains a balance due on said account in the amount of $8,203.34 
as of December 30, 1998, and defendants are in breach of said contract, having failed and 
refused to pay said balance. 
9. Plaintiff has incurred costs and attorney's fees in bringing this action for 
which it is entitled to recover. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
10. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 9 above as if set forth here in 
their entirety. 
11. During the period June 23,1998, through October 5, 1998, plaintiff agreed 
to furnish and did furnish labor and materials used by Ran Co for the construction of the building 
and improvements located on the premises described below. Summerhays was the owner and 
Ran Co was the general contractor for construction on such building and improvements. 
12. The materials and labor which were furnished by plaintiff and used in the 
construction and improvement of the premises described below has value and an agreed price of 
$8,203.34. 
13. Said materials and labor were actually delivered to said premises and were 
used in the construction and improvement thereon for the benefit of the owners of said premises. 
14. The premises upon which said materials were used are located in 
Washington County, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
ALL OF LOT 55, TAMARACK RIDGE ESTATES PHASE NO. 2, AN 
EXPANDABLE PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT, according to the Official 
Plat thereof, and in accordance with the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions recorded September 15, 1994 in Book 850, at Page 547, as Entry No. 
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478750 of Official Records Washington County, State of Utah. 
15. Within 90 days of the last work performed by plaintiff on the project, 
plaintiff filed and recorded a Notice of Mechanic's Lien on said property with the Washington 
County Recorder. Said Notice of Lien was recorded on December 31, 1998, as Entry No. 
630643, in Book 1298, at Page 836, of official records. 
16. All named defendants are the owners of said premises or claim some right, 
title, interest or other lien therein. 
17. Plaintiff has and claims a lien against the interest of all defendants in the 
subject property together with all improvements, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Section 38-1-1, et seq., as amended, for the reasonable value of the materials furnished for 
improvement of said premises in the amount of $8,203.34 plus interest thereon and its costs in 
this action. The rights, titles, claims, liens, and interest of all named defendants, and each of 
them, and all persons claiming under them, in and to the subject property are subject, junior, 
subordinate and inferior to the lien and claim of plaintiff. 
18. Plaintiff is entitled to have its lien foreclosed as provided by law and the 
proceeds from such foreclosure applied to the amount due to plaintiff. 
19. In accordance with the provisions of the contract mentioned above, and in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 38-1-18 as amended, plaintiff is entitled 
to a reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded against defendants. Within thirty (30) days after 
recording said Notice of Lien, plaintiff mailed a copy of said lien to each recorded owner of said 
real property as shown by the records of the Washington County Recorder. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
20. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above as if set forth here in their entirety. 
21. Plaintiff, within 180 days before bringing this action, contracted to furnish 
materials and services to be incorporated into or in connection with building structures and 
improvements upon the subject property owned or reported to be owned by defendant 
Summerhays. 
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22. The furnishing of the materials and services was in accordance and pursuant 
to a contract entered into between plaintiff and defendant, Ran Co in the aggregate amount of 
$8,203.34. 
23. Summerhays, as owner of the property, required said contractor to provide 
a payment bond as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 14-2-1. 
24. The reasonable value of materials and services furnished and delivered and 
incorporated in the subject property by plaintiff is $8,203.34. 
25. John Doe 1 through 5 are the sureties on said bond and under the terms 
of said bond, sureties are liable to plaintiff for the labor and materials on said real property 
because both the aforesaid owners and the contractor have failed to pay for the materials and 
labor furnished by plaintiff. 
26. Plaintiff is unaware of the identity of said sureties and will amend this 
Complaint to state the identities thereof when the same becomes known to plaintiff. 
27. Plaintiff is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee from said sureties 
as provided by Utah Code Annotated, as amended, Section 14-2-3. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
28. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 27 as set forth above as if set forth 
here in their entirety. 
29. Summerhays, as owner of the aforesaid property, failed to require Ran Co 
to furnish a bond as required by Utah Code Annotated, as amended, Section 14-2-1. 
30. As a result of the foregoing, Summerhays is liable to plaintiff for the sum 
of $8,203.34. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
31. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 30 as set forth above as if set forth 
here in their entirety. 
32. The reasonable value of said materials and labor plaintiff has provided to 
the subject property and which has been accepted by Summerhays is the sum of $8,203.34. 
33. Plaintiff has not received any payment and there remains the sum of 
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$8,203.34 yet unpaid. 
34. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Summerhays the full value of said 
materials and labor as yet unpaid, or the sum of $8,203.34, plus interest thereon at the legal rate. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against defendants as follows: 
1. Against defendant, Ran Co, for damages in the sum of $8,203.34 plus 
interest, costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 4-505.1. 
2. That the Court adjudge that the plaintiff has a valid lien upon the 
aforementioned property for the amount of $8,203.34, plus court costs, reasonable attorney's fees 
of at least an amount allowed by statute, and interest at the rate and in the amount allowed by 
contract and by law. 
3. For an order that plaintiffs mechanic's lien is prior to and superior to the 
interests of all defendants herein. 
4. For a decree of foreclosure of plaintiffs mechanic's lien and for an order 
that the Sheriff of Washington County conduct a sale and apply the proceeds from said sale first, 
to the costs of sale; second, to the satisfaction of plaintiff s lien, interest, penalty, court costs and 
attorney's fees; and third, that any surplus be given to the rightful claimants and owners. 
5. Against defendants sureties, defendants Does 1 through 5, for damages in 
the amount of $8,203.34 plus interest, costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 4-505.1. 
6. Against Summerhays for damages in the amount of $8,203.34 plus interest, 
costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 4-505.1. 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED March 29, 1999. 
Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
195 South Geneva Rd. 
Lindon, UT 84042 
re cmp 
CD^ 
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ORIGINAL 
Russell S. Mitchell (USB #6938) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RANCO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL 
Case No. 990500591 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Plaintiff Whitewater Whirlpool Baths & Systems, Inc., by and through its undersigned 
attorney, Howard Chuntz, Barbara R. Summerhays, by and through her undersigned attorney, Bruce 
C. Jenkins, and RanCo Homes, Inc., by and through its undersigned attorney, Russell S. Mitchell, 
hereby stipulate and agree that, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Plaintiffs Complaint in this matter be dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs and 
30787vl 
fees incurred herein. 
DATED: W V H 1999. DATED: 1999. 
frj<~ 
HOWARD CHUNTZ, 
Attorney for Whitewater Whirlpool Baths 
& Systems, Inc. 
DATED: f/fi/ • 1999. 
BRlfCE C. JEN&fNS, Attorney for 
Defendant Barbara R. Summerhays 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
5SEH/S. MITCI 
attorneys for Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the. day of \z-~^jqsf&*06/t~ 
\ prepaid, a true and correct fully executed copy W the foregoir postage 
DISMISSAL to: 
,1999,1 mailed, 
foregoing STIPULATION FOR 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
1149 W. Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Bruce C. Jenkins, Esq. 
352 E. Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, Utah 84790 
30787vl 
ORIGINAL 
r r 
Russell S. Mitchell (USB #6938) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RANCO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, 
Defendants. 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
Case No. 990500591 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter having come before on the parties' Stipulation for Dismissal pursuant to Rule 
41(a)(2)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court having reviewed the Stipulation, and for 
good cause appearing, 
30790vl 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. ^_^ 
DATED this / f day of S~^~/?0 , 1999. 
7 T 
JAi^ES L. SHUMATE, District Judge 
Approved as to Form 
HOWARD CHUNTZ, Attorney for Plaintiff 
r^M. 
BRUCE C. JENKZNS, 
Attorney for Defendant Barbara R. Summerhays 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ day of ^^s^JZsW^' , 1999,1 mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct unexecuted copy of the foregoing DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE to: 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
1149 W. Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Bruce C. Jenkins, Esq. 
352 E. Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, Utah 84790 
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Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RAN CO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, Civil No. 990500591 
Defendants. 
/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Howard Chuntz, upon oath duly sworn, state: 
1. Plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien lawsuit against both defendants claiming non-payment for 
work done upon the premises owned by Barbara Summerhays and completed at the direction of 
RanCo Homes, Inc. 
2. Prior to signing the Stipulation for dismissal, I negotiated a settlement of the matter 
between plaintiff and the defendants whereby RanCo Homes, Inc., would give to plaintiff a first 
position trust deed and trust deed note against certain real property located in Washington County 
and more particularly described as: 
All of Painted Desert Estates, Phase 1, Lot #4. 
3. Both myself and counsel for RanCo Homes, Inc., understood and believed that RanCo 
Homes, Inc., was giving plaintiff a first position trust deed and trust deed note against the aforesaid 
. - - ^ 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
HOWARD CHUNTZ 
property. 
4. Subsequent to the entry of the Order dismissing plaintiffs cause of action with prejudice, 
the parties learned that the trust deed note and trust deed referred to herein was not a first position 
note and, in fact, the property was being foreclosed by the holder of the first position note. 
DATED November 9, 1999. 
f ^ y 
Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of November, 1999. 
A A m
 i n ^ a i a 
JER! LARSB* 
Notary PubUc 
State of Utah 
My Corrm. Expires JUi 16,2001 
1149 Aes: Zerfc Sfset Onem Ut 8*057 
• i •> MP m 
''.&£&/ 7<bi4t 
Notary Public 
BAILING CERTIFICATE m w • p % 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this of November, 1999, to the following: 
Russell S. Mitchell 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
Attorneys for Defendant, RanCo Homes, Inc. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Bruce D. Jenkins 
Attorney for Defendant, Summerhays 
352 East Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, UT 84790 
reaff 
2 
Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 2 2 2 - 9 ^ 
MfTH I H S r i ' l ' i ' Mm' ' MIVMPN i| '• i \ n i >|. I •'• \ | [ 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, S )RGE DEPARTMENT 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BA11 IS 
& SYSTEMS TNC 
Plaintiff, 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RAN cO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
AND REINSTATE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 990500591 
Defendants. 
/ 
( i )MI' s NOW plaintiff in the above captioned matter, by and through its attorney "«"««* 
Chuntz, and moves the Court for an order setting aside the Order of Dismissal with PreiuH,. 
ordering that plaintiffs Complaint against defendants be reinstated. This Motion is supported by the 
Affidavit ot'Howaiil ( hum,' submitted 
IHTED November ^ 1W«> 
Howard Chuntz t 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY; CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ^ / d a y of November, 1999, to the following: 
Russell S. Mitchell 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
Attorneys for Defendant, RanCo Homes, Inc. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Bruce D. Jenkins 
Attorney for Defendant, Summerhays 
352 East Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, UT 84790 
re mot 
2 
Russell S. Mitchell (USB #6938^ 
' ,ES, WALDO, HOLBROOK A 
Attorneys for Defendant RanC<> ; •"••• 
249 East Tabernacle, Sui': " '> 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435)628-1627 
Fax. .435)628-5225 
0/ 
11IM'IT! II lUDU'l \ I, DISTRICT COURT FOR 
W, \ S111N i, I 'ON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WIIIII'VYAn-K WH1KI I'OOI |i \ | | | S 
MS I MI 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RAN CO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES I through 25, 
Defendants. 
H IDAVIT OF RICHARD A. NELSON 
OPPOSING MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DISMISSAL 
Case No. 990500591 
RICHARD A. NELSON, being over the age of majority and being iiiVi uu.v iworn, upon his 
oath deposes and says: 
1. I am the President of Ran Co Homes, Inc. (Ran Co"), and have personal knowledge 
of all things stated herein. 
1
 P Ii i Plauiliffs film i.', its mechanic's lien lawsuit against Ran Co, I had talked 
with representatives of Plaintiff, nanielv. Brvce W nitney. 'le local St. George manager an.,, \,.a 
Tucket'-. T.:ndon. Utah resaruiiifc i .a.,,..,;. .. ^.ai.i: . nail ''.' sm'i'T1 r 'had 
"' ua R. Summer hays nome. 
3. Throughout these discussions, I told them that I could provide to them a trust deed 
note in a third position against lot 4 in the subdivision of the development, Painted Desert Estates 
Phase 1. 
4. In addition to our discussions regarding the alleged nonpayment on the Barbara R. 
Summerhays home, I had been negotiating with them regarding another issue involving Plaintiffs 
supplying materials in the Tamarack Ridge development ("Tamarack Matter") which involved a 
disputed amount of approximately $30,000.00. I offered them a shared first position deed of trust 
on Lot 38, Painted Desert Estates Phase I regarding the Tamarack Matter. 
5. I explained to Mr. Whitney and Ms. Tucker that for the Tamarack Matter, I could 
give Plaintiff an assignment of a shared first position deed of trust for $25,000.00 and a second 
position deed of trust on Lot 38 for the remainder of the amount owed on the Tamarack Matter. I 
showed Mr. Whitney my Master Escrow files which showed on Lot 4 a first position deed of trust 
for $21,000.00 and a second position deed of trust for $5,489.14, leaving a third position available 
to resolve the Summerhays matter. 
6. While we were thus negotiating, Plaintiff filed its mechanic's lien foreclosure action 
in the Summerhays matter, presumably to keep from missing statutory deadlines. Its attorney, 
Howard Chuntz, then became involved in the negotiations and I began involving my own attorney, 
Russell S. Mitchell. 
7. I discussed the offer of settlement I had made to Plaintiff with Mr. Mitchell. I had 
him relay the offer to Plaintiff formally through Mr. Chuntz. Through an oversight and 
miscommunication, Mr. Mitchell inadvertently stated in a letter that not only the Tamarack Matter 
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would involve a first position deed of trust, but he also erroneously stated that the Summerhays 
8. Lot 4 of Painted Desert Estates Phase I is a lot -A HI :. I value of over $40,000.00 kt 
the time I was proposing this oi ici u> Piainii; \. i aid not have thv. art
 ( to gi\ e a first position deed 
. - ! •+ in the first and second 
position, Gnen the amount c? .•i-.tiffs claim, heiruionfv S<YUO<' -'H i VUMIM never have p*r \,s! 
that amount i.. a ... -
 n * < • ^ v« w. i, .* >-* 
hi ahi|c to ,i *; -* - ; m deed ui trust on it, i would have combined both the Tamarack Malic; ^ i^ 
the Summerhays matter into that one lot rather than splitting them between different lots. 
its position and payment rather than going through the litigation necessary to resolve its disputed 
:::I;i: t in i In light of the market value of these lots, and the current market condition, there was and is 
Aw. Aiici Ah. x\li^«v« r;jscnied the oiler to Mr Chuniz, and presumably after Mr. 
Chuntz and Plaintiff discussed the letter, Mr. Chuntz rejected the offer as written by Mr. Mitchell, 
•**'•''
 !
 -nu not the Tamarack Matter. 
1 \'^i:c v separate these two issues and would only agree to do the deal if it 
r e s o h v . i l • v.lii L;.v. . J I . M ^ V K *il... . ; ; U L . W : — : . « r 
22# \y e did not ever sign any type of settlement agreement formalizing the interacting 
of these different documents other than the two letters sent by my attorney. 
1 ' 
Painted Desert Estates Phase 11, and a deed of trust on Lot 4, Fainted Des__ . 
Plaintiff and had the same recorded. Plaintiff signed a plat approval form and reconveyed property 
in Tamarack Ridge Estates. 
14. Therefore, I had completely fulfilled all of the settlement agreement that I had 
agreed upon and which I had discussed directly with Plaintiff itself. 
15. Some weeks after the recordings were complete, the person with the first position 
deed of trust on Lot 4 began a foreclosure action, at which time notice went out to Mr. Chuntz. It 
is apparently based upon this that Plaintiff has now filed its Motion to Set Aside Dismissal. 
16. I cannot identify why there was a communication breakdown on whether the deed 
of trust on Lot 4 would be a first or second position deed of trust as between me and my attorney. 
However, I do know that I had extensive conversations with Mr. Whitney and Ms. Tucker about the 
property involved, and that I showed Mr. Whitney my master escrow file clearly showing the two 
deeds of trust ahead of Plaintiff on Lot 4. 
DATED this c&^ day of November, 1999. 
RICHARD A. NELSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this XX^ day of November, 1999. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JULIE 8RINT0N 
ttte.T«btrnteto,8*.20O 
8t<*oro«,Utah 84770 
ily Commission Exptoss 
January 20,3002 
STATE OF UTAH 
Julie 
-A. 
i i&inton, Notary Public 
Is' *~ 
(II SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __..^ :.f. ilii\ «>l Nmiiiiln i, I1'1'1', I \ .inscil l<> he m.uli'il, 
postage prepaid, the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. NELSON OPPOSING MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DISMISSAL to: 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
1149 W. Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Bruce C. Jenkins, Esq. 
352 E. Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, Utah 84790 
Russell S. Mitchell (USB #6938) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RAN CO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
AND 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Case No. 990500591 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Defendant Ran Co Homes, Inc. ("Ran Co"), by and through its undersigned attorney, and 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, hereby submits its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal With Prejudice, and 
requests a hearing on the same. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to Plaintiffs filing its mechanic's lien lawsuit against Defendant Ran 
Co Homes, Inc. ("Ran Co"), Richard A. Nelson ("Nelson") of Ran Co had talked with 
representatives of Plaintiff, namely, Bryce Whitney, the local St. George manager, and Ann Tucker 
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inLindon I'luh Tc^ai'dni^ I'lainliir' , i l.iiin lni |M,MU-III Ini »I;IVII:LS and materials it had provided 
in relation to Defendant Barbara R. Summerhays' home. Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson Opposing 
IVIolin i lii Set Aside Dismissal ("Affidavit"), paras. 1, 2. 
2. I hroughoutthesedis, ^^.^ v "* • i 
them, a trust deed note in a third position against lot 4 in the subdivision of the development, Painted 
Deseil Pstales Ph,ist. I AIIMLI ml JMI.I \. 
- addition to the parties' discussions regarding the alleged nonrav—..-: ••, 
llic Barbara R. Summeiiia^o iioiiiL-. Nelson had been negotiating wvn Plaintiil regarding another 
issue involving Plaintiff s M:P •>•. • r •• i • .< . de- * ' v 
K*~^-..»\ - i ^k i1Wolved a disputed amount of approximateh $30 000.00. Nelson offeree* diem a 
i . U....M , ,cbcr. L:..iaLw\. J*ii.*.^  i re^hamg inv. ; umarack 
f"» latter. Affidavit, para. 4. 
4 Nelson explained to Mr. Whitney and Ms, Tucker that for the Tamarack 
Matter, K.:r - ~>r 
$25,000.00 and a second position deed of trust on Lot 38 for the remainder ot t\u) amount owed on 
lulu 1 .iiiiuMck IVldiin Nelson sn IUMJ MI \'\ iiitiie) Kan l o s Mustci Escrow files which showed 
on I Ml 4 a 'first position deed of trust for $21,000.00 and a second position deed -:" *• * • • 
$5,489.14, leaving a third position, available to resolve the Summerhays matter. Affida\ it. para :• 
5. While flic piuiii" writ1 ihiis m tjoii iiiii| Pliiiiinil 1'iltM mi meuiaiih' ' iiiriii 
foreclosure action in the Summerhays matter, presumably to keep from,, missing statutory deadlines. 
my own attorney, Russell S. Mitchell. Affidavit, para. 6. 
32" 5 3% 1 " 2 -
6. Nelson discussed the offer of settlement he had made to Plaintiff with Mr. 
Mitchell. Nelson had Mr. Mitchell relay the offer to Plaintiff formally through Mr. Chuntz. Through 
an oversight and miscommunication, Mr. Mitchell inadvertently stated in a letter that not only the 
Tamarack Matter would involve a first position deed of trust, but he also erroneously stated that the 
Summerhays matter would be handled by a deed of trust in a first position. Affidavit, para. 7; May 
11, 1999, letter attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein. 
7. Lot 4 of Painted Desert Estates Phase I is a lot with a value of over 
$40,000.00. At the time Ran Co was proposing this offer to Plaintiff, it did not have the ability to 
give a first position deed of trust on Lot 4 or any other lot. There were already deeds of trust on Lot 
4 in the first and second position. Given the amount of Plaintiff s claim, being only $8,000.00, Ran 
Co would never have put just that amount in a first position deed of trust for a $40,000.00 lot. Had 
Ran Co had that lot free and clear to be able to a first position deed of trust on it, I would have 
combined both the Tamarack Matter and the Summerhays matter into that one lot rather than 
splitting them between different lots. Affidavit, para. 8. 
8. Ran Co's whole purpose of allowing the deed of trust in favor of Plaintiff was 
to secure payment to Plaintiff rather than going through the litigation necessary to resolve its 
disputed claim. In light of the market value of these lots, and the current market condition, there was 
and is more than eough equity in the lot to safely secure the deed of trust. Affidavit, para. 9. 
9. After Mr. Mitchell presented the offer to Mr. Chuntz, and presumably after 
Mr. Chuntz and Plaintiff discussed the letter, Mr. Chuntz rejected the offer as written by Mr. 
Mitchell, aand instead wanted to only do the Summerhays part of the deal and not the Tamarack 
Matter. Affidavit, para. 10. 
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10 R an Co reii ised to separate tl lese t * o ; " ,im "" ", • I \ ' en lid onl\ agi ee to do the 
i it 1 if it resolved both the Tamarack and Summerhays issue- iavit, para. 11. 
^ —.. .v. .*rter on Ju
 : . 999, after further conversations, 
wherein there was no reference to the deed of trust on I ^ M r < J ih , in; i firsl p< >si.tlc in J- Jlh < 26. 1/999, 
letter attached hereto as Exhibit " B " and incorporated herein. 
1
 I he parties did not e \ ei s i | ;.tM ;
 : , • ettlement agreement formalizing the 
interacting of these different documents other than the two letters sent by Ran Go's attorney. 
Aft"klii\ it, para. LI. 
13. Pursuant ! •  4hc. n • :<• • 
Lot 38, Painted Desert Estates Phase 11 ami a icec o« trust or. 1 m 4, t i n t e d . l^sert Estates Pliase 
' lid had, the same i: ecor dec! I 'laintiff signed a plat approval form and reconveyed 
pi open) in Tamarack Ridge Estates. Affidavit, para. 13. 
•iciciore Ran Co had, completely fulfilled, all of the settlement agreement 
that it had agreed upon and 
1 5. Some weeks after the recordings were complete, the person with the first 
posilinii died ul III null nun I i il I IIIH;pan tt toteelosure action, at s\ hich time notice went out to Mr. 
( 'hunt/ It is apparently based upon this that Plaintiff has now filed its Motion to Set Aside 
I JIMIIIMIIII Allidavit, para 1,5. 
16. Kan r n n n n n l identity uln thnv n is mi i oniniiii ' •'••' * :" -! "! " •'= "", i 
it and its attorney. However, Nelson did have extensive comersations with: PL:in: - ^ 
i epresentath esj"1* li tf h;itiie) aiidli Is I ucl i:ei , about the property i n v o l v e s O l i u t i i u i jNCiSUli d t U i i n > W 
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show Mr. Whitney Ran Co's Master Escrow file clearly showing the two deeds of trust ahead of 
PlaintiffonLot4. Affidavit, para. 16. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF'S INITIAL MOTION IS INSUFFICIENT TO SET 
FORTH LEGAL GROUNDS FOR THE RELIEF IT SEEKS. 
Plaintiff filed no Memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss, but merely filed a short 
Affidavit of its attorney supporting its Motion. Plaintiffs Motion, on its face, fails the technical 
requirements associated with a Motion to Set Aside to be brought before the Court and should fail 
on that ground alone. "All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities " Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 (l)(a) 
(emphasis added). There was no memorandum filed to support its Motion, nor did Plaintiff refer to 
a memorandum within its Motion. Furthermore, the Motion fails to set forth what legal grounds it 
relies on in bringing the Motion. Such a memorandum is mandatory, and failure to include it is fatal 
to Plaintiffs Motion. 
In addition, the Affidavit of Howard Chuntz should be stricken from the record, as it is 
irrelevant to the issue at hand and contains hearsay statements. The Affidavit cannot take the place 
of, or serve as, a memorandum of points and authorities. Furthermore, Mr. Chuntz, as Plaintiffs 
attorney, is not a proper person to give factual evidence regarding Plaintiffs actions. It is one thing 
for an attorney to give an Affidavit regarding attorney's fees or specific procedural actions he or she 
has taken, such as what discovery has been completed or what discovery is needed and why, but it 
is an entirely different thing to try to give factual evidence regarding the understanding of a 
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Affidavit of Mr. Chuntz as a supporting memorandum -r a j proivr statement ot ia^is -,\ * n ) 
support for its I\ lotion, I laintiff s I\ lotion to Set Aside .i,u.*: : c ^ i , , ^ . 
II. 
THERE WAS NO MISTAKE ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
Plaintiff had been in direct communication with Ran Co uno-mhout the negotiations and 
cannot now attempt to avoid its settlement agreement based on a mistake by the parties' counsel. 
Possibly. Plaintiffishopim- t|v( *>)\m wii annh the legal annlvsis of Rule 60(hV 1) of the I tab Rules 
i»i L.oii Proceduis. uia\ ^mcb UL hda^iuv, Da^u on a niiVuiixv >i the Court doe.bdcv.uK to apply this 
.mi l . • . . . * .
 r v . ( i . - ,f 
Plamufl However, there is nu athdavit trom Plaintiit claiming there was a -y,>take on its part or 
betv een the par ties. 
The parties themselves had discussed and agreed on a settlement between them which was 
fully executed. Both parties knew to what they were agreeing. Mr. Nelson of Ran. Co and Mr. 
Whitewat- [iml discussed in (it dnl llllul illlir SummtThay* iimlfcr viould 
He handled h\ a \ urd position vteed o! trust. Mr. Nelson had shown Mr. Whitne> a W ister Escrow 
iin' \riii)iu^ nidi mi uiMiii ir HI* i i 11 i l l II S i i i i 1 1 1 ii II II III 1 ii i I  I HI1 mi 1 1 1 i n III mi mi I MI i c p lately 
protected by the equity in the property. The only time that a reference to Lot 4 as a first position was 
made was in one letter in the early part of the discussion between the parties' counsel All 
discussions bvtwmi the pniln iliaiiisdvfs rvpressly rMenvd In tlwl deed of (nisi as ,i llliinl posituin 
32": 50 II -6-
deed of trust. In addition, in a subsequent letter from Ran Co's counsel to Whitewater's counsel, 
after Whitewater had rejected the offer in the earlier letter, the erroneous reference to this deed of 
trust being in a first position was not repeated. 
"Settlement are favored in the law, and should be encouraged, because of the obvious 
benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also the judicial system." Tracy Collins Bank & Tr. Co. 
v. Travelstead. 529 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979). In the case at hand, the parties had reached a 
settlement. The deeds of trust and other documents clearly put into effect the agreement discussed 
between the parties themselves. The agreement reached by the parties should not be undone by the 
Court. A mistaken state of mind of one or both parties' attorneys is not reflective of what the parties 
themselves knew and intended, and should not be grounds for unwinding a good settlement 
agreement. 
Even if Plaintiff thought there was a discrepancy between what it was hearing from Ran Co 
directly and what its attorney was telling it, Plaintiff was under a duty to discover on its own the true 
status of the deed of trust that would be recorded. Utah law on unilateral mistake requires ordinary 
diligence on the part of the mistaken party regarding the fact in question or the resulting agreement 
will not be set aside. John Call Engg.. Inc. v. Manti Citv Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205,1209 (Utah 1987). 
If there was a mistake about the relative position of the deed of trust being given, it was Plaintiffs 
unilateral mistake. Considering it had see the Master Escrow file showing the other two superior 
deeds of trust, ordinary diligence would require it to resolve this difference by some direct means, 
such as having a quick title search done on the affected property, which Plaintiff did not do. 
Plaintiff itself knew it was accepting a third position deed of trust on Lot 4, regardless of 
what its attorney believed. Now that Lot 4 is being foreclosed on, and it stands to lose its equity in 
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the lot jnij.v-. • ' * ii UM, u wants to exploit a confusion between the 
parties' counsel that did not exist between the parties themselves. The Court should not allow tl lis 
result, but should deny Plaintiff s request. 
HI. 
IF THE COURT SETS THE DISMISSAL ASIDE, 11 touai' 
UNDO THE ENTIR F AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
If the Court determines that Plaintiffs Motion is legally sufficient, and if the Cour. .,;-
determines that it should set aside the Oulci o«l Dismissal, ilu1 "In " < in "HUM • I M> rescind the entire 
agreemtiii k'lwu'" i i' i'j"H< including the other deeds of trust in the Tamarack Matter. The 
negotiations of the parties clearly shows that they were working to achieve a gic L\ 1 
outstanding issues between ihein i lit: \ •! K i M mn l>c «'oor, and should not be undone, in a 
pirc 'meal fashion. The Court should include in any Order setting aside the dismissal, an Order 
requiring Plaintiff to sign deeds of reconveyance on an JIR .-. 
CONCLUSii/ii 
Based on the foregoing Memorandum and Affidavit filed herewith *:u . . v 
Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal \V\\\\ I'm MI nil However, if the Court chooses to grant 
11,1111111')'" N11111 (i )ii, the Court should order Plaintiff to sign all necessary documents to reconvey all 
di'i'ils of trust recorded as part, of the settlement agreement helneui llii pail, n,1:. 
I h\ I I'll) tins J^s «!M\ i.CNovember, 1999. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLE 
By 
S. Mitchell 
/ Attorneys for Defendant Ran Co Homes, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / ^ day of November, 1999,1 caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING to: 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
1149 W. Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Bruce C. Jenkins, Esq. 
352 E. Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, Utah 84790 
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J O N E S , WALDO, H O L B R O O K & M C D O N O U G H 
WASHINGTON, Q.C. OFFICE. 
Al l CONSTITUTION AVE.. N.E. 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2 0 0 0 2 
TELEPHONE (202) 5-4-7-7711 
FAX <202> 5A7-57 I7 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A N D C O U N S E L O R S 
ISOO WELLS FARGO PLAZA 
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT L A K E CITY, UTAH S ^ l O I - 1 6 ^ 4 -
TELEPHONE <80l) 5 2 1 - 3 2 0 0 
FAX (SOI) 3 2 8 - O S 3 7 
www.joneswaldo com 
ST. GEORGE OFFICE 
THE TABERNACLE TOWER BLDG. 
SUITE 200 
2<*9 EAST TABERNACLE 
ST. GEORGE. UTAH 8 4 7 7 0 - 2 9 7 8 
TELEPHONE (435) 628-1627 
FAX (435) 6 2 8 - 5 2 2 5 
IN REPLY REFER TO: 
ST. GEORGE 
May 11, 1999 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Re: Whitewater Whirlpool Baths v. RanCo Homes, et al. 
Civil No. 990500591 
Settlement Negotiations 
Dear Mr. Chuntz: 
As we discussed on the telephone today, enclosed are copies of documents to be used to 
complete the settlement being proposed by RanCo Homes ("RanCo"). This letter is for 
settlement purposes only, and RanCo makes no admissions nor does it waive any defenses 
hereby. 
RanCo proposes to completely resolve all disputes between the parties including the case 
referenced above, as follows: 
A. Regarding Whitewater's claim for $30,556.94, RanCo will assign $25,000.00 of 
its first position Note in Lot No. 38, proposed PAINTED DESERT PHASE NO. 
2., and give a second position Trust Deed and Note in the same property in the 
amount of $5,556.94. The amounts will be paid, plus 9% interest, as soon as the 
lot is sold, or in two years from the date of the Assignment, Deed, and Note, 
whichever first occurs. If we can conclude this quickly, the two years will run 
from April 13, 1999. To make this deal work, the following documents need to 
be executed (copies of all are enclosed herewith): 
1. Request for full Reconveyance regarding Proposed Tamarack Ridge 
Estates, Phase 4, Lot #40; 
2. Request for Full Reconveyance regarding Proposed Tamarack Ridge 
Estates, Phase 4, Lot #41; 
3. Modification to Note & Trust Deed which sets forth the assignment of 
$25,000.00 of the first position Deed of Trust; 
4. Assignment of Deed of Trust for 71.44% of the beneficial interest in 
Proposed Painted Desert Estates, Phase 2, Lot #38; A 
EXHIBIT. A. 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
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5. Trust Deed Note in the amount of $5,556.94; 
6. Trust Deed securing the Note for Proposed Painted Desert Estates, Phase 
2, Lot #38; and 
7. Consent to Plat. 
B. Regarding Whitewater's claim for $8,203.34 regarding the Summerhays home 
and the above-referenced civil claim, RanCo will give a first-position Trust Deed 
and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $8,203.34, the same to bear interest at 9% 
and to be paid in full as soon as the lot is sold, or in two years from the date of 
the Trust Deed and Note, whichever first occurs. To make this deal work, the 
following documents need to be executed (copies of all are enclosed herewith): 
1. Trust Deed Note in the amount of $8,203.34; and 
2. Trust Deed securing the Note for All of Painted Desert Estates, Phase 1, 
Lot #4. 
In addition, please find enclosed several pages of marketing materials currently being 
used to sell the lots at the Painted Desert Subdivision, which includes a price list of the lots 
being sold in Phase 1 and a layout of the subdivision with lots identified for Phase 1 and one 
showing all phases. Also enclosed is an appraisal showing the price of Lot #2 in Phase 1 at 
$60,000.00. 
As you review these materials, I believe you will find that RanCo's proposals give not 
only a very secure position on real estate, but that Whitewater will also obtain the benefit of a 
very good interest rate of 9% during the time it takes for the lots to sell. 
If you have any questions regarding the above offer, please do not hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
cc: RanCo Homes 
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IN REPLY REFER TO: 
ST. GEORGE 
July 26, 1999 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Re: Whitewater Whirlpool Baths v. RanCo Homes, et aL 
Civil No. 990500591 
Settlement Negotiations 
Dear Mr. Chuntz: 
This letter is in follow-up of our several conversations regarding the final resolution of the 
issues involving Whitewater Whirlpool Baths, RanCo Inc. and RanCo Homes (collectively herein 
"RanCo"). Whitewater and RanCo had previously reached a settlement agreement wherein 
Whitewater was given a second position trust deed note on two parcels of property in the 
combined amount of the $30,556.94 settlement amount. These will now be reconveyed to RanCo 
Inc. in exchange for an assignment of a first position on a different parcel, located in Painted 
Desert Phase 2, in the amount of $25,000 with a second position trust deed note on this same 
parcel in the amount of $7,928.53 (this amount represents the interest accrued through July 
22,1999 since the settlement was first reached in addition to the $5,556.94 principal amount). 
Interest will accrue on the assignment amount and on the trust deed note at nine percent (9%) 
from July 23, 1999. This change is in conjunction with the settlement regarding the Summerhays 
matter, which is resolved by Whitewater being given a trust deed note in the amount of 
$8,203.34, in exchange for Whitewater dismissing its above referenced complaint against 
Summerhays, RanCo Homes, and Does 1-25, and releasing all claims against RanCo Homes. 
RanCo has fully executed the modification, assignment, trust deeds, and trust deed notes 
involved. I will have the trust deeds recorded, and the original trust deed notes sent to you, 
immediately upon my receiving from you the following documents executed by your client: 
A. Request for full Reconveyance regarding Proposed Tamarack Ridge Estates, Phase 
4, Lot #40 (original enclosed); 
B. Request for Full Reconveyance regarding Proposed Tamarack Ridge Estates, Phase 
4, Lot #41 (original enclosed); 
CYUIRIT P> 
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C. Modification to Note & Trust Deed which sets forth the assignment of $25,000.00 
of the first position Deed of Trust and calculation of accrued interest (original 
enclosed); 
D. Consent to Plat (necessary because of the assigned interest in Phase 2 of Painted 
Desert) (original enclosed); and 
E. Rule 41(a) "Notice of Dismissal" as to RanCo Homes regarding the above 
referenced case, with the understanding that it will also be dismissed against 
Summerhays. I will leave it between you and Mr. Jenkins to determine whether 
to file a stipulation or allow the court to dismiss as to Summerhays for failure to 
prosecute. 
A copy of the following documents are enclosed for your reference. As stated above, I 
will record the Trust Deeds and mail to you the original Trust Deed Notes as set forth above: 
1. Assignment of Deed of Trust for 71.44% of the beneficial interest in Proposed 
Painted Desert Estates, Phase 2, Lot #38; 
2. Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $7,928.53 in Proposed Painted 
Desert Estates, Phase 2, Lot #38; and 
3. Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $8,203.34 in Painted Desert 
Phase 1, Lot #4. 
In addition, as you requested, please find enclosed a copy of the original Trust Deed 
which is the basis for the assignment of interest of $25,000 to Whitewater. If you have any 
questions regarding these documents, please do not hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801)222-9700 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, ST GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., REPLY TO RICHARD A 
NELSON'S MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiff, IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION 
v. 
BARBARA R SUMMERHAYS, RAN CO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, Civil No. 990500591 
Defendants. 
/ 
COMES NOW plaintiff in the above captioned matter, by and through its attorney, Howard 
Chuntz, and replies to the Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiffs Motion submitted by RanCo 
Homes, Inc. Plaintiff submits the Affidavit of Bryce Whitney (attached hereto Exhibit "A") and the 
Affidavit Ann Tucker (attached hereto as Exhibit "B"), the two individuals referred to in RanCo's 
president's Affidavit. Those Affidavits refute the allegations set forth in defendant's Memorandum 
as well as Mr. Nelson's Affidavit. Whitewater's personnel ceased dealing with Mr. Nelson regarding 
this matter in or about Inarch of 1999 after the matter was submitted to Whitewater's attorney for 
the institution of legal action. Thereafter, all of the negotiations and agreements occurred between 
Whitewater's attorney and RanCo's attorney without any interceding discussions between the parties 
or any of their agents other than attorneys. In addition to the May 11, 1999, letter between counsel 
for these parties that RanCo's attorney submitted as Exhibit "A" to RanCo's Memorandum in 
Opposition, RanCo's attorney sent Whitewater's attorney a July 26, 1999, letter outlining the final 
agreement between the parties. (See Exhibit "C" attached hereto). The letters from RanCo's 
attorney, along with the Affidavits from plaintiffs employees substantiate that the only mistake that 
was made was in the communications between RanCo and its attorney. There was no mistake or 
misunderstanding between plaintiff concerning the terms of the agreement. What was being offered 
prior to March of 1999 was rejected by the institution of a lawsuit. Thereafter, the attorneys for the 
parties worked out a new agreement with respect to the Summerhays lawsuit. 
Finally, there is no need to rescind the entire agreement between the parties. The other 
matters that were concluded that did not involve the first position trust deed that was offered for 
settlement of the Summerhays matter was an entirely different matter in time and place and for which 
separate and distinct consideration was given and accepted by the parties. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that its Motion to set aside the dismissal with prejudice as 
previously prayed for be granted. 
DATED this )S day of December, 1999. 7 ^—N /" '\ 
Howard Chuntz 4 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREB^CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this /<^>v ^ day of December, 1999, to the following: 
Russell S. Mitchell 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
Attorneys for Defendant, RanCo Homes, Inc. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Bruce D. Jenkins 
Attorney for Defendant, Summerhays 
352 East Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, UT 84790 
re rep 
r/i/ , — - ? ^ ^ 
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Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801)222-9700 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRYCE WHITNEY 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RAN CO Civil No. 990500591 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, 
Defendants. 
/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, Bryce Whitney, upon oath duly sworn, state: 
1. I am the manager of plaintiffs St. George outlet and have personal knowledge of the 
things stated herein. 
2. During early 1997 I had discussions with Richard Nelson of RanCo Homes, Inc., 
regarding debts that he owed to Whitewater with respect to materials and labor Whitewater provided 
to him long before the Summerhays project began. 
3. We discussed taking promissory notes and trust deeds against various properties in 
the Tamarack Ridge development and in each instance I indicated that I would pass this information 
along to Whitewater's president for an agreement. 
4. Later in 1998 I discuss with Mr. Nelson issues concerning paying his debts with 
respect to the sums owed on the Summerhays job and he made various proposals with respect to 
taking different lots as security per a trust deed and trust deed note. As previously done, I indicated 
that I would pass on all information to Whitewater's president for any arrangements that would be 
agreed upon. 
5. By March of 1999 no satisfactory agreement had been reached and I was advised to 
cease dealing with this matter as it had been turned over to Whitewater's attorney. 
6. Subsequent to March, 1999,1 had no further discussions with Mr. Nelson or anyone 
else from RanCo Homes, Inc., with respect to settling the Summerhays matter. 
7. At no time did I ever advise Mr. Nelson that Whitewater was willing to accept a third 
position trust deed on any property as satisfaction of the claims arising out of the Summerhays matter. 
T> MTVt thiT j r , i JjV ^^rnrihrr 1999. 
SHAR HEITKOTTER 
791 So. Bluff St. 
St. George, Utah 04770 
*S *$! My Commission expiras 
January 15, 2002 
CJTATK OF UTAiL Bryce Whitney 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \C> i^ day of December, 1999. 
(j Kf^ Q 4k^^H 
Notary Public 
2 
Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801)222-9700 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., AFFIDAVIT OF 
ANN TUCKER 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RAN CO Civil No. 990500591 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, 
Defendants. 
/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Ann Tucker, upon oath duly sworn, state: 
1. I am the collection's officer for the above named plaintiff and have personal 
knowledge of the information set forth below and would so testify if called upon to do so in a court 
of law. 
2. Prior to April, 1999,1 did have discussions with Richard Nelson regarding the debt 
that RanCo Homes, Inc., owed to Whitewater with respect to the Summerhays property and listened 
to various proposals made by him with respect to satisfying that obligation. 
3. Mr. Nelson was advised that all proposals would be submitted to Whitewater's 
president for approval before anything could be done. 
4. If Mr. Nelson had told me that he was offering Whitewater a trust deed note in a third 
position against any particular lot in satisfaction of RanCo's obligation, I would have rejected that 
offer out of hand and not even submitted it to Whitewater's president. I do not recall ever receiving 
such a proposal from Mr. Nelson. 
5. Prior to April of 1999 no agreement was reached with Mr. Nelson with respect to the 
Summerhays project and I ceased having discussions with Mr. Nelson concerning after the matter was 
turned over to Whitewater's attorney in March of 1999. 
6. I later was advised by Whitewater's attorney, Howard Chuntz, of various other 
proposals that Mr. Nelson, through his attorney, was making to settle the Summerhays matter and 
communicated those to Whitewater's president. 
7. The proposal that was finally accepted by Whitewater was a first position note and 
trust deed in the sum of $8,203.34. 
8. The final agreement was negotiated by Whitewater's attorney, Howard Chuntz, and 
approved by Whitewater's president. 
DATED this Qi day of December, 1999. 
Ann Tucker 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^* /day of December, 1999. 
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IN REPLY REFER TO: 
ST. GEORGE 
July 26, 1999 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Re: Whitewater Whirlpool Baths v. RanCo Homes, et al. 
Civil No. 990500591 
Settlement Negotiations 
Dear Mr. Chuntz: 
This letter is in follow-up of our several conversations regarding the final resolution of the 
issues involving Whitewater Whirlpool Baths, RanCo Inc. and RanCo Homes (collectively herein 
"RanCo"). Whitewater and RanCo had previously reached a settlement agreement wherein 
Whitewater was given a second position trust deed note on two parcels of property in the 
combined amount of the $30,556.94 settlement amount. These will now be reconveyed to RanCo 
Inc. in exchange for an assignment of a first position on a different parcel, located in Painted 
Desert Phase 2, in the amount of $25,000 with a second position trust deed note on this same 
parcel in the amount of $7,928.53 (this amount represents the interest accrued through July 
22,1999 since the settlement was first reached in addition to the $5,556.94 principal amount). 
Interest will accrue on the assignment amount and on the trust deed note at nine percent (9%) 
from July 23, 1999. This change is in conjunction with the settlement regarding the Summerhays 
matter, which is resolved by Whitewater being given a trust deed note in the amount of 
$8,203.34, in exchange for Whitewater dismissing its above referenced complaint against 
Summerhays, RanCo Homes, and Does 1-25, and releasing all claims against RanCo Homes. 
RanCo has fully executed the modification, assignment, trust deeds, and trust deed notes 
involved. I will have the trust deeds recorded, and the original trust deed notes sent to you, 
immediately upon my receiving from you the following documents executed by your client: 
A. Request for full Reconveyance regarding Proposed Tamarack Ridge Estates, Phase 
4, Lot #40 (original enclosed); 
B. Request for Full Reconveyance regarding Proposed Tamarack Ridge Estates, Phase 
4, Lot #41 (original enclosed); 
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C. Modification to Note & Trust Deed which sets forth the assignment of $25,000.00 
of the first position Deed of Trust and calculation of accrued interest (original 
enclosed); 
D. Consent to Plat (necessary because of the assigned interest in Phase 2 of Painted 
Desert) (original enclosed); and 
E. Rule 41(a) "Notice of Dismissal" as to RanCo Homes regarding the above 
referenced case, with the understanding that it will also be dismissed against 
Summerhays. I will leave it between you and Mr. Jenkins to determine whether 
to file a stipulation or allow the court to dismiss as to Summerhays for failure to 
prosecute. 
A copy of the following documents are enclosed for your reference. As stated above, I 
will record the Trust Deeds and mail to you the original Trust Deed Notes as set forth above: 
1. Assignment of Deed of Trust for 71.44% of the beneficial interest in Proposed 
Painted Desert Estates, Phase 2, Lot #38; 
2. Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $7,928.53 in Proposed Painted 
Desert Estates, Phase 2, Lot #38; and 
3. Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $8,203.34 in Painted Desert 
Phase l ,Lot#4. 
In addition, as you requested, please find enclosed a copy of the original Trust Deed 
which is the basis for the assignment of interest of $25,000 to Whitewater. If you have any 
questions regarding these documents, please do not hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
26630.1 
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Russell S. Mitchell (USB #6938) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
.,-.. r-~-\- T V 
01 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WHITEWATER WHIRLPOOL BATHS 
& SYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. SUMMERHAYS, RANCO 
HOMES, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE 
Case No. 990500591 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court on May 17, 2000, at 1:29 p.m. at the time regularly 
scheduled for a telephonic hearing on all pending matters before the Court. Plaintiff was represented 
through its counsel, Howard Chuntz, connected by telephone in the Judge's chambers. Defendant 
Barbara R. Summerhays was represented by her attorney, Bruce C. Jenkins. Defendant Ran Co 
Homes, Inc., was present through its president, Richard A. Nelson, and was represented by its 
counsel, Russell S. Mitchell of and for Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. The Court 
36514vl 
having thoroughly reviewed the related pleadings and affidavits in the file, having heard arguments 
of all parties through their counsel, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Motion to 
Set Aside Dismissal With Prejudice is denied. The Court's earlier ruling made without benefit of 
a hearing is stricken. This case shall remain dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this J^ day ofJSfiy, 2000. 
JAMES L. SHUMATE, District Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
HOWARD CHUNTZ, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
z**2-
BRUCE C. JEJ<TKINS, Attorney for 
Defendant Barbara R. Summerhays 
NOTICE 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Plaintiff will submit the above and 
foregoing Order Denying Motion to Set Aside to the Fifth District Court for signature on the 
expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice unless written objection is filed prior to that 
time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this / f f ^ ^ d a y of May, 2000. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
5. Mitchell 
Attorneys for Defendant Ran Co Homes, Inc. 
i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __v/_^_Tday of May, 2000,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct unexecuted copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE to: 
Howard Chuntz, Esq. 
1149 W. Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Bruce C. Jenkins, Esq. 
352 E. Riverside Drive, Suite C-4 
St. George, Utah 84790 
36514vl 3 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, or-
ders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at 
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discov-
ered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discov-
ered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, re-
leased, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
